IoT Notary: Sensor Data Attestation in Smart Environment by Panwar, Nisha et al.
IOT NOTARY: Sensor Data Attestation in Smart
Environment
Nisha Panwar, Shantanu Sharma, Guoxi Wang, Sharad Mehrotra, Nalini Venkatasubramanian,
Mamadou H. Diallo, and Ardalan Amiri Sani
University of California, Irvine, California, USA.
Abstract—Contemporary IoT environments, such as smart
buildings, require end-users to trust data-capturing rules
published by the systems. There are several reasons why such
a trust is misplaced — IoT systems may violate the rules
deliberately or IoT devices may transfer user data to a malicious
third-party due to cyberattacks, leading to the loss of individuals’
privacy or service integrity. To address such concerns, we propose
IOT NOTARY, a framework to ensure trust in IoT systems and
applications. IOT NOTARY provides secure log sealing on live
sensor data to produce a verifiable ‘proof-of-integrity,’ based on
which a verifier can attest that captured sensor data adheres to
the published data-capturing rules. IOT NOTARY is an integral
part of TIPPERS, a smart space system that has been deployed
at UCI to provide various real-time location-based services
in the campus. IOT NOTARY imposes nominal overheads for
verification, thereby users can verify their data of one day in
less than two seconds.
I. INTRODUCTION
While fine-grained continuous monitoring by IoT devices
(e.g., camera and WiFi access-points) offers numerous benefits
and empowers existing systems with new capabilities, it
also raises several privacy and security concerns (e.g.,
smoking habits, gender, and religious belief). To highlight
the privacy concern, we first share our experience in building
location-based services at UC Irvine using WiFi connectivity
data.
Use-case: University WiFi data collection. In our on-going
project, entitled TIPPERS [1], we have developed a variety
of location-based services based on WiFi connectivity dataset.
At UC Irvine, more than 2000 WiFi access-points and four
WLAN controllers (managed by the university IT department)
provide campus-wide wireless network coverage. Whenever
a device connects to the campus WiFi network (through
an access-point), the access-point generates Simple Network
Management Protocol (SNMP) trap for this association event.
Each association event contains access-point-id, si, user device
MAC address, dj , and the time of the association, tk. All
SNMP traps 〈si, dj , tk〉 are sent to access-point’s controllers in
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realtime. The access-point controller anonymizes device MAC
addresses (to preserve the privacy of users in the campus).
TIPPERS collects WiFi connectivity data from one of
the controllers that manage 490 access-points and receives
〈si, dj , tk〉 tuples for each connectivity event. However,
before receiving any WiFi data, TIPPERS notifies all WiFi
users about the data-capture rules by sending emails over
a university mailing list. Subsequently, based on WiFi
connectivity data 〈si, dj , tk〉, TIPPERS provides various
realtime applications. Some of these services, e.g., computing
occupancy levels of (regions in) buildings in the form of a
live heatmap, require only anonymous data. Other services,
e.g., providing location information (within buildings) or
contextualized messaging (to provide messages to a user when
he/she is in the vicinity of the desired location), require user’s
original disambiguated data. To date, over one hundred users
have registered into TIPPERS to utilize realtime services. A
key requirement imposed by the university in sharing data with
TIPPERS is that the system supports provable mechanisms
to verify that individuals have been notified prior to their
data (anonymized or not) being used for service provisioning.
Also, an option for users to opt-out of sharing their WiFi
connectivity data with TIPPERS must be supported. If users
opt-out, the system must prove to the users that indeed their
data was not shared with TIPPERS. TIPPERS use immutable
log-sealing to help all users to verify that the captured data is
consistent with pre-notified data-capture rules.
Our experience in working with various groups in the
campus is that (persistent) location data can be deemed quite
sensitive by certain individuals with concerns about the spied
upon by the administration or by others. Thus, mechanisms
for notification of data-capture rules, secure log-sealing, and
verification components made a sub-framework, entitled IOT
NOTARY, which has become an integral part of TIPPERS.
Data-capture concerns in IoT environments are similar to
that in mobile computing, where mobile applications may have
continuous access to resident sensors on mobile devices. In the
mobile setting, data-capture rules and permissions are used to
control data access, i.e., which applications have access to
which data generated at the mobile device (e.g., location and
contact list) for which purpose and in which context. However,
in IoT settings, the data-capture framework differs from that
in the mobile settings, in two important ways:
1) Unlike the mobile setting, where applications can seek
user’s permission at the time of installation, in IoT settings,
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there are no obvious mechanisms/interfaces to seek users’
preferences about the data being captured by sensors
of the smart environment. Recent work [2] has begun
to explore mechanisms using which environments can
broadcast their data-capture rules to users and seek their
explicit permissions.
2) Unlike the mobile setting, users cannot control sensors in
IoT settings. While in mobile settings, a user can trust
the device operating system not to violate the data-capture
rules, in IoT settings, trust (in the environment controlling
the sensors) may be misplaced. IoT systems may not be
honest or may inadvertently capture sensor data, even if
data-capture rules are not satisfied.
We focus on the above-mentioned second scenario and
determine ways to provide trustworthy sensing in an untrusted
IoT environment. Thus, the users can verify their data captured
by IoT environment based on pre-notified data-capture rules.
Particularly, we deal with three sub-problems, namely secure
notification to the user about data-capture rules, secure (sensor
data) log-sealing to retain immutable sensor data, as well as,
data-capture rules, and remote attestation to verify the sensor
data against pre-notified data-capture rules by a user, without
being heavily involved in the attestation process.
Our contribution and outline of the paper. We provide:
• A user-centric framework (§III) to ensure trustworthy data
collection in untrusted IoT spaces, entitled IOT NOTARY.
• Two models to inform the user about the data-capture rules
(§IV-A): notice-only model and notice-and-ACK model.
• A secure log-sealing mechanism (§IV-B) implemented
by secure hardware that cryptographically retains logs,
data-capture rules, sensors’ state, and contextual information
to generate a proof-of-integrity in an immutable fashion.
• A secure attestation mechanism (§IV-C), mixed with SIGMA
protocol [3], allowing a verifier (a user or a non-mandatory
auditor) to securely attest the sealed logs as per the
data-capture rules. Implementation results of IOT NOTARY
on the university live WiFi data are provided in §V.
Full version. Due to space limitations, we could not
describe several details about IOT NOTARY, which are given
in the full version [4]. These include: future temporal
password-based notification method, log retrieval at the verifier
using SIGMA, details of the verification phase, throughput and
communication cost experiments, and security proofs.
II. MODELING IOT DATA ATTESTATION
A. Entities
Our model has the following entities, see Figure 1:
Infrastructure Deployer (IFD). IFD (which is the university
IT department in our use-case; see §I) deploys and owns
a network of p sensors devices (denoted by s1, s2, . . . , sp),
which capture information related to users in a space.
The sensor devices could be: (i) dedicated sensing devices,
e.g., energy meters and occupancy detectors, or (ii) facility
providing sensing devices, e.g., WiFi access-points and
RFID readers. Our focus is on facility providing sensing
Infrastructure Deployer (IFD, 
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Users
Service 
Provider
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Figure 1: Entities in IOT NOTARY.
devices, especially WiFi access-points that also capture
some user-related information in response to services. E.g.,
WiFi access-points capture the associated user-device-ids
(MAC addresses), time of association, some other parameters
(such as signal strength, signal-to-noise ratio); denoted by:
〈di, sj , tk, param〉, where di is the ith user-device-id, sj is
the jth sensor device, tk is kth time, and param is other
parameters (we do not deal with param field and focus on
only the first three fields). All sensor data is collected at a
controller (server) owned by IFD. The controller may keep
sensor data in cleartext or in encrypted form; however, it only
sends encrypted sensor data to the service provider.
Service Providers (SP). SP (which is TIPPERS in our
use-case; see §I) utilizes the sensor data of a given space
to provide different services, e.g., monitoring a location and
tracking a person. SP receives encrypted sensor data from the
controller.
Data-capture rules. SP establishes data-capture rules (denoted
by a list DC having different rules dc1, dc2, . . . , dcq).
Data-capture rules are conditions on device-ids, time, and
space. Each data-capture rule has an associated validity that
indicates the time during which a rule is valid. Data-capture
rules could be to capture user data by default (unless the user
has explicitly opted out). Alternatively, default rules may be
to opt-out, unless, users opt-in explicitly. Consider a default
rule that individuals on the 6th floor of the building will be
monitored from 9pm to 9am. Such a rule has an associated
condition on the time and the id of the sensor used to generate
the data. Now, consider a rule corresponding to a user with a
device di opting-out of data capture based on the previously
mentioned rule. Such an opt-out rule would have conditions
on the user-id, as well as, on time and the sensor-id. For
sensor data for which a default data-capture rule is opt-in,
the captured data is forwarded to SP, if there does not exist
any associated opt-out rules, whose associated conditions are
satisfied by the sensor data. Likewise, for sensor data where
the default is opt-out, the data is forwarded to SP only, if
there exists an explicit opt-in condition. We refer to the sensor
data to have a sensor state (si.state denotes the state of the
sensor si) of 1 (or active), if the data can be forwarded to
SP; otherwise, 0 (or passive). In the remaining paper, unless
explicitly noted, opt-out is considered as the default rule, for
simplicity of discussion.
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Whenever SP creates a new data-capture rule, SP must
send a notice message to user devices about the current
usage of sensor data (this phase is entitled notification phase).
SP uses Intel Software Guard eXtension (SGX) [5], which
works as a trusted agent of IFD, for securely storing sensor
data corresponding to data-capture rules. SGX keeps all valid
data-capture rules in the secure memory and only allows to
keep such data that qualifies pre-notified valid data-capture
rules; otherwise, it discards other sensor data. Further, SGX
creates immutable and verifiable logs of the sensor data (this
phase is entitled log-sealing phase). The assumption of secure
hardware at a machine is rational with the emerging system
architectures, e.g., Intel machines are equipped with SGX [6].
However, existing SGX architectures suffer from side-channel
attacks, e.g., cache-line, branch shadow, page-fault attacks [7],
which are outside the scope of this paper.
Users. Let d1, d2, . . . , dm be m (user) devices carried by
u1, u2, . . . , um′ users, where m′ ≤ m. Using these devices,
users enjoy services provided by SP. We define a term, entitled
user-associated data. Let 〈di, sj , tk〉 be a sensor reading. Let
di be the ith device-id owned by a user ui. We refer to
〈di, sj , tk〉 as user-associated data with the user ui. Users
worry about their privacy, since SP may capture user data
without informing them, or in violation of their preference
(e.g., when the opt-out was a default rule or when a user
opted-out from an opt-in default). Users may also require SP
to prove service integrity by storing all sensor data associated
with the user (when users have opted-in into services), while
minimally being involved in the attestation process and storing
records at their sides (this phase is entitled attestation phase).
Auditor. An auditor is a non-mandatory trusted-third-party
that can (periodically) verify entire sensor data against
data-capture rules. Note that a user can only verify his/her
data, not the entire sensor data or sensor data related to other
users, since it may reveal the privacy of other users.
B. Threat Model
We assume that SP and users may behave like adversaries.
The adversarial SP may store sensor data without informing
data-capture rules to the user. The adversarial SP may tamper
with the sensor data by inserting, deleting, modifying, and
truncating sensor readings and secured-logs in the database. By
tampering with the sensor data, SP may simulate the sealing
function over the sensor data to produce secured-logs that are
identical to real secured-logs. Thus, the adversary may hinder
the attestation process and make it impossible to detect any
tampering with the sensor data by the verifier (that may be
an auditor or a user). Further, as mentioned before that SP
utilizes sensor data to provide services to the user. However,
an adversarial SP may provide false answers in response to
user queries. We assume that the adversarial SP cannot obtain
the secret key of the enclave (by any means of side-channel
attacks on SGX). Since we assumed that sensors are trusted
and cannot be spoofed, we do not need to consider a case
when sensors would collude with SP to fabricate the logs.
An adversarial user may repudiate the reception of notice
messages about data-capture rules. Also, an adversarial user
may impersonate a real user to retrieve the sensor data and
secured-log during the verification phase. Thus, an adversarial
user may reveal the privacy of the users by observing
sensor data. Also, a user may infer the identity of other
users associated with sensor data by potentially launching
frequency-count attacks (e.g., by determining which device-ids
are prominent).
C. Security Properties
In the above-mentioned adversarial model, an adversary
wishes to learn the (entire/partial) data about the user, without
notifying or by mis-notifying about data-capture rules, such
that the user/auditor cannot detect any inconsistency between
data-capture rules and stored sensor data at SP. Hence, a secure
attestation algorithm must make it detectable, if the adversary
stores sensor data in violation of the data-capture rules notified
to the user. To achieve a secure attestation algorithm, we need
to satisfy the following properties:
Authentication. Authentication is required: (i) between SP
and users, during notification phase; thus, the user can detect
a rogue SP, as well as, SP can detect rogue users, and (ii)
between SP and the verifier (auditor/user), before sending
sensor data to the verifier to prevent any rogue verifier
to obtain sensor data. Thus, authentication prevents threats
such as impersonation and repudiation. Further, a periodic
mutual authentication is required between IFD and SP, thereby
discarding rogue sensor data by SP, as well as, preventing any
rogue SP to obtain real sensor data.
Immutability and non-identical outputs. We need to
maintain immutability of notice messages, sensor data, and
the sealing function. Note that if the adversary can alter
notice messages after transmission, it can do anything with
the sensor data, in which case, sensor data may be completely
stored or deleted without respecting notice messages. Further,
if the adversary can alter the sealing function, the adversary
can generate a proof-of-integrity, as desired, which makes
the flawless attestation impossible. The output of the sealing
function should not be identical for each sensor reading
to prevent an adversary to forge the sealing function (and
to prevent the execution of frequency-count attack by the
user). Thus, immutability and non-identical outputs properties
prevent threats, e.g., inserting, deleting, modifying, and
truncating the sensor data, as well as, simulating the sealing
function.
Minimality, non-refutability and privacy-preserving
verification. The verification method must find any
misbehavior of SP, during storing sensor data inconsistent
with pre-notified data-capture rules. However, if the verifiers
wish to verify a subset of the sensor data, then they should
not verify the entire sensor data. Thus, SP should send a
minimal amount of sensor data to the verifier, enabling them
to attest what they wish to attest. Further, the verification
method: (i) cannot be refuted by SP, and (ii) should not reveal
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Figure 2: Dataflow and computation in the protocol. Trusted parts are shown in shaded boxes.
any additional information to the user about all the other users
during the verification process. These properties prevent SP to
store only sensor data that is consistent with the data-capture
rules notified to the user. Further, these properties preserve
the privacy of other users during attestation and impose
minimal work on the verifier.
D. Assumptions
This section presents assumptions, we made, as follows:
1) The sensor devices are assumed to be
computationally-inefficient to locally generate a verifiable log
for the continuous data stream as per the data-capture rules.
2) Sensor devices are tamper-proof, and they cannot be
replicated/spoofed (i.e., two devices cannot have an identical
id). In short, we assume a correct identification of sensors,
before accepting any sensor-generated data at the controller at
IFD, and it ensures that no rogue sensor device can generate
the data on behalf of an authentic sensor. Further, we assume
that an adversary cannot deduce any information from the
dataflow between a sensor and the controller. Recall that in
our setting the university IT department collects the entire
sensor data from their owned and deployed sensors, before
sending it to TIPPERS.
3) We assume the existence of an authentication protocol between
the controller and SP, so that SP receives sensor data only from
authenticated and desired controller.
4) The communication channels between SP and users, as well
as, between SP and auditor are insecure. Thus, our solution
incorporates an authenticated key exchange based on SIGMA
protocol (which protects sender identity). When the verifier’s
identity is proved, the cryptographically sealed logs are sent
to the verifier.
5) By any side-channel attacks on SGX, one cannot tamper with
SGX and retrieve the secret-key of SGX. (Otherwise, the
adversary can simulate the sealing process.)
III. IOT NOTARY
This section presents an overview of the three phases and
dataflow among different entities and devices, see Figure 2.
Notification phase: SP to Users messages. This is the
first phase that notifies users about data-capture rules for the
IoT space using notice messages (in a verifiable manner for
later stages). Such messages can be of two types: (i) notice
messages, and (ii) notice-and-acknowledgment messages. SP
establishes (the default) data-capture rules and informs trusted
hardware ( 1 ). Trusted hardware securely stores data-capture
rules ( 2 , 5 ) and informs the trusted notifier ( 3 ) that
transmits the message to all users ( 4 ). Only notice messages
need a trusted notifier to transmit the message (see §IV-A).
Log-sealing phase: Sensor devices to SP messages. Each
sensor sends data to the controller ( 0 ). The controller receives
the correct data, generated by the actual sensor, as per our
assumptions (and settings of the university IT department).
The controller sends encrypted data to SP ( 6 ) that
authenticates the controller using any existing authentication
protocol, before accepting data. Trusted hardware (Intel SGX)
at SP reads the encrypted data in the enclave ( 7 ).
Working of the enclave. The enclave decrypts the data and
checks against the pre-notified data-capture rules. Recall that
the decrypted data is of the format: 〈di, sj , tk〉, where di
is ith user-device-id, sj is the jth sensor device, and tk is
kth time. After checking each sensor reading, the enclave
adds a new field, entitled sensor (device) states. The sensor
state of a senor sj is denoted by sj .state , which can be
active or passive, based on capturing user data. For
example, sj .state = active or (1), if data captured by the
sensor sj satisfies the data-capture rules; otherwise, sj .state
= passive or (0). For all the sensors whose state = 0, the
enclave deletes the data. Then, the enclave cryptographically
seals sensor data, regardless of the sensor state, and provides
cleartext sensor data of the format: 〈di, sj , sj .state = 1, tk〉 to
SP ( 8 ) that provides services using this data ( 9 ). Note that
the cryptographically sealed logs and cleartext sensor data are
kept at untrusted storage of SP ( 8 , 10).
Verification phase: SP to verifier messages. In our model,
an auditor and a user can verify the sensor data. The
auditor can verify the entire/partial sensor data against
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data-capture rules by asking SP to provide cleartext sensor
data and cryptographically sealed logs ( 8 , 10). The users
can also verify their own data against pre-notified messages
or can verify the results of the services provided by SP
using only cryptographically sealed logs (12). Note that
using an underlying authentication technique (as per our
assumptions), auditor/users and SP authenticate each other
before transmitting data from SP to auditor/users.
IV. ATTESTATION PROTOCOL
This section presents three phases of attestation protocol.
Preliminary Setup Phase. We assume a preliminary setup
phase that distributes public keys (PK ) and private keys (PR),
as well as, registers user devices into the system. The trusted
authority (which is the university IT department in our setup of
TIPPERS) generates/renews/revokes keys used by the secure
hardware enclave (denoted by 〈PKE ,PRE〉) and the notifier
(denoted by 〈PKN ,PRN 〉). The keys are provided to the
enclave during the secure hardware registration process. Also,
〈PK di ,PRdi〉 denotes keys of the ith user device. Usages
of keys: The controller uses PKE to encrypt sensor readings
before sending to SP. PRE is also used by the enclave to
write encrypted sensor logs and decrypt sensor readings. PKN
is used during the notification phase by SGX to send an
encrypted message to the notifier. User device’s keys are used
during device registration, as given below.
We assume a registration process during which a user
identifies herself to the underlying system. For instance, in a
WiFi network, users are identified by their mobile devices, and
the registration process consists of users providing the MAC
addresses of their devices (and other personally identifiable
information, e.g., email and a public key). During registration,
users also specify their preferred modality through which the
system can communicate with the user (e.g., email and/or push
messages to the user device). Such communication is used
during the notification phase.
A. Notification Phase
The notification phase informs data-capture rules
established by SP to the (registered) users by explicitly
sending notice messages. We consider two models for
notification, differing based on acknowledgment from users.
In the notice-only model (NoM), SP informs users of
data-capture rules, but users may not acknowledge receipt of
the message. Such a model is used to implement policies,
when data capture is mandatory, and the user cannot exercise
control, over data capture. Since there is no acknowledgment,
SP is only required to ensure that it sends a notice, but is
not required to guarantee that the user received the notice.
In contrast, a notice-and-ACK model (NaM) is intended for
discretionary data-capture rules that require explicit permission
from users prior to data capture. Such rules may be associated,
for instance, with fine-grained location services that require
users’ location. A user can choose not to let SP track his
location, but will likely not be able to avail some services.
Implementation of notification differs based on the model
used. Interestingly, since NaM requires acknowledgment, the
notification phase is easier as compared to NoM that uses
a trusted notifier to deliver the message to users. Below we
discuss the implementation of both models:
Notification implementation in NoM. NoM assumes that, by
default, data-capture rules are set not to retain any user data,
unless SP, first, informs SGX about a data-capture rule, (i.e.,
SP cannot use the encrypted sensor data for building any
application, see 9 in Figure 2). When SP creates a new
data-capture rule, SP must inform SGX. Then, the enclave
encrypts the data-capture rule using the public key (i.e., PKN )
of the notifier and informs the trusted notifier (via SP) about
the encrypted data-capture rule by writing it outside of the
enclave (in our user-case §I, the university IT department
works as a trusted notifier). Data-capture rules are maintained
by SP on stable storage, which is read by SGX into the enclave
to check, if the sensor data should be forwarded to SP. SGX
can retain a cache of rules in the enclave, if such rules are
still valid (and hence used for enforcement).1 Finally, the
trusted notifier acknowledges SP about receiving the encrypted
data-capture rule, and then, informs users of the encrypted
data-capture rule via signed notice messages. On receiving
the notice message, the users may decrypt it and obtain the
data-capture rule.
To see the role of trusted hardware above, suppose that SP
was responsible for informing users about data-capture rules
directly. Since data-capture rules are also required by SGX
during log-sealing (PHASE 2), an adversarial SP may inform
SGX, not to users, or may inform non-identical rules to users
and to SGX. Hence, SP cannot inform the rule to users directly.
To see the role of the trusted notifier above, suppose that SP
can directly inform users about encrypted data-capture rules
obtained from SGX. An adversarial SP may not deliver the
data-capture rule to all/some of the users; thus, an encrypted
data-capture rule is not helpful. Thus, a trusted notifier ensures
that the notice message is sent to all the registered users. Note
that the trusted notifier might be a trusted web site that lists
all the data-capture rules, which users can access.
Implementation of notification in NaM. Unlike NoM, the
notification phase of NaM does not require the trusted notifier.
In NaM, by default, SP cannot utilize all those sensor readings
having device-ids for which the users have not acknowledged.
Likewise NoM, in NaM, SP informs data-capture rules to SGX
that encrypts the rule and writes outside of the enclave. The
encrypted rules are delivered by SP to users, unlike NoM.
On receiving the message, a user may securely acknowledge
the enclave about her consent. The enclave retains all those
device-ids that acknowledge the notice message for log-sealing
phase and considers those device-ids during the log-sealing
phase to retain their data while discarding data of others.
1Due to the enclave’s limited memory, it cannot keep all valid and non-valid data-capture
rules, after a certain size. Thus, the enclave writes all non-valid data-capture rules on
the disk, after computing a secured hash digest over all rules. Taking a hash over the
rules is needed to maintain the integrity of all rules.
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Figure 3: Cryptographically sealing procedure executed on a chunk, Cx. Gray-shaded data is not stored on the disk. White-shaded
data is stored on the disk and accessible by SP. Figure shows proof-of-integrity for a chunk, Cx.
B. Log Sealing Phase
The second phase does cryptographically sealing of
the sensor data for future verification against pre-notified
data-capture rules. The sensor data is sealed into secured
logs using authenticated data structures, e.g., hash-chains and
XOR-linked lists (as shown in Figures 3, 4), by the sealing
function, Sealing(PRE , 〈di, sj , sj .state, tk〉), executed in the
enclave at SP. Let us explain log-sealing in the context of WiFi
connectivity data. The enclave reads the encrypted sensor data
( 7 in Figure 2) and executes the three steps: (i) decrypts the
data, (ii) checks the data against pre-notified valid data-capture
rules, and (iii) cryptographically seals the data and store
appropriate secured logs.
Below we explain our log sealing approach. To simplify
the discussion, we consider the case when all the sensor data
satisfies some data-capture rule (i.e., the state of all the sensor
data is one), and hence, data is forwarded to and stored at
SP §IV-B1. Likewise, the protocol to deal with all sensor
data having state one, a protocol can also deal with the case
when some sensor data satisfies some data-capture rule, while
remaining sensor data does not satisfy any rule (i.e., the state
of the remaining sensor data is zero). However, due to page
limitations, we skip details of such a protocol.
1) Sealing Entire Sensor Data: The sealing operation
contains three phases: (i) chunk creation, (ii) hash-chain
creation, and (iii) proof-of-integrity creation; described below.
PHASE 1: Chunk creation. The first phase of the sealing
operation finds an appropriate size of a chunk (to speed up
the attestation process). Note that the incoming encrypted
sensor data may be large, and it may create problems during
verification, due to increased communication between SP and
the verifier. Also, the verifier needs to verify the entire data,
which have been collected over a large period of time (e.g.,
months/years). Further, creating cryptographic sealing over
the entire sensor data may also degrade the performance of
Sealing() function, due to the limited size of SGX enclave.
Thus, we first determine an appropriate chunk size, for each
of which the sealing function is executed.
The chunk size depends on time epochs, the enclave size,
the computational overhead of executing sealing on the chunk,
and the communication overhead for providing the chunk to
the verifier. A small chunk size reduces the communication
overhead and maintains the log minimality property, thereby
during the log verification phase, a verifier retrieves only the
desired log chunks, instead of retrieving the entire sensor data.
Consequently, SP stores many chunks.
PHASE 2: Hash-chain creation. Consider a chunk, Cx, that
can store at most n sensor readings, each of them of the
format: 〈di, sj , tk〉. The sealing function checks each sensor
reading against data-capture rules and adds sensor state to
each reading, as: 〈di, sj , sj .state, tk〉. Since in this section we
assumed that all sensor data will be stored, the sensor state
of each sensor reading is set to 1. The sealing function starts
with the first sensor reading of the chunk Cx, as follows:
First sensor reading. For the first sensor reading of the chunk,
the sealing function computes a hash function on value
zero, i.e, H(0). Then, the sealing function mixes H(0) with
the remaining values of the sensor reading, i.e., sensor-id,
device-id, sensor state, and time, at which it computes the hash
function, denoted by H(d1||sj ||sj .state||tk||H(0)) that results
in a hash digest, denoted by hx1 . After processing the complete
first sensor reading of the chunk Cx, the enclave writes
cleartext first sensor reading of Cx, i.e., 〈d1, sj , sj .state, tk〉
on the disk, which can be accessed by SP.
Second sensor reading. Let 〈d2, sj , sj .state, tk+1〉 be the
second sensor reading. For this, the sealing function works
identically to the processing of the first sensor reading. It
computes a hash function on the second sensor values, while
mixing it with the hash digest of the first sensor reading, i.e.,
H(d2||sj ||sj .state||tk+1||hx1) that results in a hash digest, say
hx2 . Finally, the enclave writes the second sensor reading in
cleartext on the disk.
Processing the remaining sensor readings. Likewise, the
second sensor reading processing, the sealing function
computes the hash function on all the remaining sensor
readings of the chunk Cx. After processing the last sensor
reading of the chunk Cx, the hash digest hxn is obtained.
PHASE 3: Proof-of-integrity creation. Since each sensor
reading is written on disk, SP can alter sensor readings, to
make it impossible to verify log integrity by an auditor. Thus,
to show that all the sensor readings are kept according to the
pre-notified data-capture rules, the sealing function prepares
an immutable proof-of-integrity for each chunk, as follows:
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𝑑1, 𝑠1, 1, 𝑡5, 𝑜1
𝑥
𝑑2 , 𝑠2, 1, 𝑡6, 𝑜2
𝑥
𝑑3, 𝑠1, 1, 𝑡7, 𝑜3
𝑥
𝑑4, 𝑠1, 1, 𝑡8, 𝑜4
𝑥
𝒫𝐼𝑐𝑥 ← 𝑔
𝑏 , 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑃𝐾𝐸(ℎ4 ۩ 𝑆𝑒𝑜𝑐
𝑥 )
𝒫𝑈𝑐𝑥 ← 𝑔
𝑏 , 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑃𝐾𝐸 ℎ𝑞
𝑒𝑛𝑑۩𝑆𝑒𝑜𝑐
𝑥
𝑑1, 𝑠1, 1, 𝑡1, 𝑜1
𝑣
𝑑2 , 𝑠2, 1, 𝑡2, 𝑜2
𝑣
𝑑3, 𝑠1, 1, 𝑡3, 𝑜3
𝑣
𝑑4, 𝑠1, 1, 𝑡4, 𝑜4
𝑣
𝒫𝐼𝑐𝑣 ← 𝑔
𝑎 , 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑃𝐾𝐸(ℎ4 ۩ 𝑆𝑒𝑜𝑐
𝑣 )
𝒫𝑈𝑐𝑣 ← 𝑔
𝑎 , 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑃𝐾𝐸 ℎ𝑞
𝑒𝑛𝑑۩𝑆𝑒𝑜𝑐
𝑣
𝑑1, 𝑠1, 1, 𝑡9, 𝑜1
𝑦
𝑑2 , 𝑠2, 1, 𝑡10, 𝑜2
𝑦
𝑑3, 𝑠1, 1, 𝑡11, 𝑜3
𝑦
𝑑4, 𝑠1, 1, 𝑡12, 𝑜4
𝑦
𝒫𝐼𝑐𝑦 ← 𝑔
𝑐 , 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑃𝐾𝐸(ℎ4 ۩ 𝑆𝑒𝑜𝑐
𝑦
)
𝒫𝑈𝑐𝑦 ← 𝑔
𝑐 , 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑃𝐾𝐸 ℎ𝑞
𝑒𝑛𝑑۩𝑆𝑒𝑜𝑐
𝑦
Chunk 𝒄𝒗 Chunk 𝒄𝒙 Chunk 𝒄𝒚
Figure 4: PHASE 3: end of chunk, Seoc , creation for three chunks. Observe that Sxeoc = g
a ⊕ gb ⊕ gc.
For each chunk Ci, the sealing function generates a random
string, denoted by gj , where i 6= j. Let Cv , Cx, and Cy be
three consecutive chunks (see Figure 4), based on consecutive
sensor readings. Let ga, gb, and gc be random strings for
chucks Cv , Cx, and Cy , respectively. The use of random strings
will ensure that any of the consecutive chunks have not been
deleted by SP (will be clear in §IV-C). Now, for producing
the proof-of-integrity for the chunk Cx, the sealing function:
(i) executes XOR operation on ga, gb, gc, whose output is
denoted by Sxeoc , where eoc denotes the end-of-chunk; (ii)
signs hxn XORed with S
x
eoc with the private key of the enclave;
and (iii) writes the proof-of-integrity for log verification
of the chunk Cx with the random string gb, as follows:
PICx = (gb,SignPRE (h
x
n ⊕ Sxeoc))
Note. We do not generate the proof for each sensor reading.
The enclave writes only the proof and the random string for
each chunk to the disk, which is accessible by SP. Further, the
sensor readings having the state one are written on the disk,
based on which SP develops services.
Example. Please see Figure 3, where the middle box shows
PHASE 2 execution on four sensor readings. Note that the hash
digest of each reading is passed to the next sensor reading on
which a hash function is computed with the sensor reading.
After computing h4, the proof-of-integrity, PI, is created that
includes signed h4 ⊕ Sxeoc and a random string, gb.
Note. g∗ for the first chunk. The initialization of log sealing
function requires an initial seed value, say g∗, due to the
absence of 0th chunk. Thus, in order to initialize the secure
binding for the first chunk, the seed value is used as a
substitute random string.
2) Sealing Data for User Data/Service Verification:
While capturing user-associated data, users may wish to
verify their user-associated data against notified messages.
Note that the protocol presented so far requires entire
cleartext data to be sent to the verifier to attest log integrity
(it will be clear soon in §IV-C). However, such cleartext data
transmission is not possible in the case of user-associated
data verification, since it may reveal other users’ privacy.
Thus, to allow verification of user-associated data (or
service/query result2 verification), we develop a new sealing
method, consists of the three phases: (i) chunk creation, (ii)
2The users, who access services developed by SP (as mentioned in §I), may also wish to
verify the query results, since SP may tamper with the data to show the wrong results.
hash-generation, and (iii) proof-of-integrity creation. Chunk
creation phase of this new sealing method is identical to the
above-mentioned chunk creation phase 1; see §IV-B1. Below,
we only describe PHASE 2 and PHASE 3.
PHASE 2: Hash-generation. Consider a chunk, Cx, that can
have at most n sensor readings, each of them of the format:
〈di, sj , sj .state, tk〉. Our objective is to hide users’ device-id
and its frequency-count (i.e., which device-id is prominent in
the given chunk). Thus, on the ith sensor reading, the sealing
function mixes dj with tk, and then, computes a hash function
over them, denoted by H(dj ||tk) that results in a digest value,
say oi. Note that hash on device-ids mixed with time results
in two different digests for more than one occurrence of
the same device-id. Note that oi helps the user to know his
presence/absence in the data during attestation, but it will not
prove that tampering has not happened with the data. Then,
the sealing function mixes oi with the sensor state (to produce
a proof of sensor state) of the ith sensor reading, and on which
it computes the hash function, denoted by H(oi||sj .state) that
results in a hash digest, denoted by huxi . After processing the
ith sensor reading of the chunk Cx, the enclave writes oi on the
disk. After processing all the n sensor readings of the chunk
Cx, the sealing function computes XOR operation on all hash
digests, huxi , where 1 ≤ i ≤ n: hux1⊕hux2⊕ . . .⊕huxn, whose
output is denoted by huxend . (Reason of computing hu
x
end will
be clear in §IV-C).
PHASE 3: Proof-of-integrity creation for the user. The
sealing function prepares an immutable proof-of-integrity
for users, denoted by PU , for each chunk and writes
on the disk. Likewise, proof-of-integrity for entire log
verification, PI (§IV-B1), for each chunk, the sealing
function obtains Seoc ; refer to PHASE 3 in §IV-B1.
Now, for producing PU for the chunk Cx, the sealing
function: (i) signs huxend XORed with S
x
eoc with the
private key of the enclave, and (ii) writes the signed
output with the random string of the chunk, gb, as PUCx .
PUCx = (gb,SignPRE (hu
x
end ⊕ Sxeoc))
Note. The enclave writes hash digests, oi for each sensor
reading, the proof for user verification, and the random string
for each chunk on the disk. Of course, the sensor readings
having the state one are written on the disk.
Example. Please see Figure 3, where the last box shows
PHASE 2 execution on four sensor readings to obtain the
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proof-of-integrity for the user, PU .
C. Attestation Phase
The attestation phase contains two sub-phases: (i) key
establishment between the verifier and SP to retrieve logs,
and (ii) verification of the logs. Due to space restrictions, we
skip the key establishment phase. Here, we briefly describe
the verification process at the auditor and/or the user.
Verification process at the auditor. Recall that the auditor can
verify any part of the sensor data. Suppose the auditor wishes
to verify a chunk Cx; see Figure 4. Hence, entire sensor data
(the data written in first box of Figure 3) of the chunk Cx,
random strings ga, gb, and gc (corresponding to the previous
and next chunks of Cx; see Figure 4), and proof-of-integrity
PICx are provided to the auditor. The auditor performs the
same operation as in PHASE 2 of §IV-B2. Also, the auditor
computes the end-of-chunk string Sxeoc = g
a⊕ gb⊕ gc. At the
end, the auditor matches the results of hxn ⊕ Sxeoc against the
decrypted value of received PICx , and if both the values are
identical, then it shows that the entire chunk is unchanged.
Note that since SP transfers sensor readings of the chunk Cx,
random strings (ga, gb, and gc) and PICx to the user, SP can
alter any transmitted data. However, SP cannot alter the signed
SignPRE (h
x
n ⊕ Sxeoc), due to unavailability of the private key
of the enclave, PRE , which was generated and provided by
the trusted authority to the enclave. Thus, by following the
above-mentioned procedure on the sensor readings of Cx, any
inconsistency created by SP will be detected by the auditor.
Verification process at the user. If the user wishes to verify
his data in a chunk, say Cx, the user is provided all hash
digests computed over device-id and time (oi, see the last box
in Figure 3), time, sensor state, random strings ga, gb, and gc
(see Figure 4), and the proof PU by SP. Since, the user knows
her device-id, first, the user verifies her occurrences in the
data by computing the hash function on her device-id mixed
with provided time values and compares against received hash
digests. This confirms the user’s presence/absence in the data.
Also, to verify that no hash-digest is modified/deleted by SP,
the user computes the hash function on the sensor state mixed
with the received oi (1 ≤ i ≤ n, where n in the number of
sensor readings in Cx) and computes huxend = hx1⊕hx2⊕ . . .⊕
hxn. Finally, the user computes hu
x
end ⊕ Sxeoc and compares
against the decrypted value of PU . The correctness of this
method can be argued in a similar manner to the correctness
of the verification at the auditor.
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
This section presents our experimental results on live WiFi
data. We execute IOT NOTARY on a 4-core 16GB RAM
machine equipped with SGX at Microsoft Azure cloud.
Setup. In our setup, the IT department at UCI is the trusted
infrastructure deployer. It also plays the role of the trusted
notifier (notifying users over emailing lists). At UCI, 490
WiFi sensors, installed over 30 buildings, send data to a
controller that forwards data to the cloud server, where
IOT NOTARY is installed. The cloud keeps cryptographic
log digests that are transmitted to the verifier, while sensor
data, qualifies data-capture rules, is ingested into realtime
applications supported by TIPPERS. We use SHA-256 as the
hashing algorithm and 256-bit length random strings in IOT
NOTARY. We allow users to verify the data collected over the
last 30minutes (min).
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Dataset size.
Although IOT
NOTARY deals
with live WiFi
data, we report
results for data
processed by
the system over
180 days during
which time
IOT NOTARY
processed 13GB
of WiFi data
having 110
million WiFi
events.
Data-capture
rules. We set the
following four
data-capture
rules: (i)
Time-based:
always retain data, except from ti to tj each day; (ii)
User-location-based: do not store data about specified devices
if they are in a specific building; (iii) User-time-based: do
not capture data having a specific device-id from tx to ty
(x 6= i, y 6= j) each day; and (iv) Time-location-based: do
not store any data from a specific building from time tx to ty
each day. The validity of these rules was 40 days. After each
40-days, variables i, j, x, y were changed.
Exp 1. Storage overhead at the cloud. We fix the size of
each chunk to 5MB, and on average, each of them contains
≈ 37K sensor readings, covering around 30min data of 30
buildings in peak hours. Based on 5MB chunk size, we got
3291 chunks for 180 days. For each chunk, the sealing function
generates two types of logs: (i) for auditor verification that
produced proof-of-integrity PI of size 512bytes, and (ii) for
user verification that produces hashed values (see Figure 3)
and proof-of-integrity for users PU of size 1.05MB. Figure 5
shows 180-days WiFi data size without having sealed logs (red
color) and with sealed logs (green color).3
Exp 2. Performance at the cloud. For each 5MB chunk, the
sealing function took around 310ms to seal each chunk. This
includes time to compute PI, PU and encrypt them.
3The reason of getting more chunks is that during non-peak hours 5MB chunk can store
sensor readings for more than one hour. However, as per our assumption, we allow the
user to verify the data collected over the last 30min. Hence, regardless of chunk is full
or not, we compute the sealing function on each chunk after 30min.
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Number of Chunks 1 50 100 500 1000 3000
≈ duration (day) 30-60min 1-2 2-5 8-18 35-55 175
Time (seconds) 1 49 102 544 1160 4400
Table I: The auditor verification time. Duration varies due to
different class schedules in buildings and working hours.
Exp 3. Auditor verification time. The auditor at our campus
has a 7th-Gen quad-core i7CPU and 16GB RAM machine.
It downloads the chunks from the cloud and executes auditor
verification. The auditor varied the number of chunks from 1
to 3000; see Table I. Note that to attest one-day data across 30
buildings, the auditor needs to download at most 50 chunks,
which took less than 1min to verify. Observe that as the
number of chunks increases, the time also increases, due to
executing the hash function on more data.
Exp 4: Verification at a resource-constrained user. To show
the practicality of IOT NOTARY for resource-constrained users,
we considered four types of users, differing on computational
capabilities (e.g., available main memory (1GB/2GB) and
the number of cores (1 or 2 cores)). Each user verified
1/10/20-days data; see Figure 6. Note that verifying 1-day
data, which is ≈ 50 blocks, at resource-constrained users
took at most 30s. As the number of blocks increases,
the computational time also increases, where the maximum
computational time to verify 20-days data was < 10min. As
the days increase, so does data transmitted to the user, which
spills over to disk causing an increased latency. Also, we
execute the same experiment on a powerful user having 4-core
and 16GB machine. Note that as the number of core and
memory increase, it results in parallel processing and absence
of disk data read. Thus, the computation time decreases (see
user 5 in Figure 6).
VI. COMPARISON WITH EXISTING WORK
We classify the related work in the area of IoT attestation
into the following three categories:
Attestation in the context of IoT. The existing remote
attestation protocols verify the internal memory state of
untrusted devices through a trusted remote verifier. For
example, AID [8] attests the internal state of neighboring
devices through key exchange and proofs-of-non-absence.
SEDA [9] attests embedded devices and provides the number
of devices that pass attestation. Also, DARPA [10] and
SANA [11] allow detection of physical attacks by using
heartbeat messages and provide aggregate network attestation.
In short, existing work cannot verify sensor data against the
data-capture rules, except sensors’ internal state. In contrast,
IOT NOTARY does not deal with the verification of the
internal state of sensors, since in our case, (WiFi access-point)
sensors deployed by a trusted entity (e.g., the university IT
department). Of course, cyberattacks are possible on sensors
to maliciously record data and that can also be detected by
IOT NOTARY.
Attestation using secure hardware. [12] provided
SGX-based attestation method for physical attacks on
the sensor. Fiware [13] provides secure key management
through key vault running in SGX. However, [12], [13] cannot
verify any sensor data. Also, in [12], [13], if data-capture
rules are mis-notified to the user, SGX cannot detect any
inconsistency. In contrast, IOT NOTARY does not deal with
attacks on sensors, as well as, a specific key management
protocol. However, IOT NOTARY can detect and discard
the sensor data that does not comply with the notifications
released earlier.
Integrity verification. [14] proposed a privacy-preserving
scheme based on zero-knowledge proofs to detect
log-exclusion attacks. [15] proposed a Bloom tree that
stores proof of logs at an untrusted cloud. vSQL [16] may
be used for verifying cleartext query results. However, these
techniques cannot detect log deletion and incur significant
overheads. For example, vSQL takes more than 4000 seconds
to verify a SQL query. In contrast, IOT NOTARY provides
complete security to sensor data and realtime data attestation
approach.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper presented a framework, IOT NOTARY for sensor
data attestation through cryptographically enforced log-sealing
mechanisms to produce immutable proofs, used for log
verification. We improve the naı¨ve end-to-end encryption
model, where retroactive verification is not provable. The
user-data verification mechanism allows users to revoke
services of the concerned IoT space. Thus, we empower the
users with the right-to-audit instead of right-to-own the data
captured by sensors. IOT NOTARY is a part of a real IoT
system (TIPPERS) and provides verification on live WiFi data
with almost no overheads on users.
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